CurrentVersion\Run\Barbicas

10 de December de 2014 Por

Editor’s Note: tomorrow morning our colleague Antonio Sanz is going to be giving a talk on the malware described in this post, and the handling of the incident associated with its detection at CCN-CERT‘s 8th STIC Conferences.

Last August, several possibly targeted employees of one of our customers (a strategic company) received a number of messages somewhat “suspicious” that concerned the then relatively recent crash of the Malaysia Airlines plane.


When opening the document, with a .doc extension, a sort of “statement” regarding the accident in question appeared.


However, a basic analysis revealed that the file was actually an RTF (and not a DOC), and it came with a gift: our old friend, the CVE-2012-0158 exploit. As the file hashes had no public presence in the usual services (VirusTotal, Malwr.com, etc. and obviously it was not detected by the corporate AV), and given the nature of the message recipients, we thought it would not hurt to “play” a little more with the artifact, running it on our sandbox.

After about 12 minutes (!) waiting, the sample finally tried to contact something, and, to our surprise, that something was a public WebDAV provider service. So the malware used that protocol over HTTP (and not over HTTPS, according to the results of our latest tests), for anything it was trying to receive, or to transmit…

Indeed, simulating the WebDAV server to which it was trying to connect in our lab, the sample was trying first to download information from a particular path inside the WebDAV, and then it uploaded into another path some pseudorandom named files (but with known file extensions).


After exploiting, the malicious RTF attachment substituted himself with a “clean” document (the statement about the accident) that it had embedded (so if you tried to analyze the dropped documentseparately, there was no way to repair on the existence of the exploit or the rest of the malware), and opened it with Word, perfectly mimicking the usual opening of a DOC file. However, in background, it was dropping and running a .vbs file, which in turn dropped an embedded DLL file (which it had hexencoded in its own source code).

This DLL (dropped directly into %SystemRoot% if the user had the necessary privileges, or into the user’s profile otherwise) was loaded using the Windows command regsvr32, persisting through an invocation of that command on the usual HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry branch. For this attachment, the key was written with the name Barbicas (a word resembling “small beard” in spanish).


Elaborating on the dynamic analysis of the DLL (static analysis did not throw much more at that point), we note the presence of a packer which took a large amount of CPU time, over several minutes, to unpack its guest (another DLL file). The packer deobfuscated the malicious code on further pages of the memory map of the process, running it (addresses 0x7FF40000 and 0x7FF80000 in the screenshot).


Inside the process memory we could see the URL of the WebDAV server as well as the username and password used to access it, along the upload and download paths, and the extensions of the files that are uploaded.


Once unpacked with standard reversing techniques, it was possible to dump the DLLs (rebuilding their Import Tables) in order to statically analyze in more depth the deobfuscated code. The first thing that struck us was the presence of the AES algorithm initialization tables in the data section of the DLL.


Indeed, the malware uses the AES encryption algorithm in CBC mode.


The key used has a length of 256 bits, being hardcoded in the memory of the sample.


Indeed, the size of encrypted files is always a multiple of 16 bytes, the block size of AES, and the encrypted files include the initialization vector of the block cipher mode (as shown by the parameters used in the calls to the encryption and decryption routines observed during the dynamic analysis we conducted), adding another extra 16 bytes to the file sizes.

So far, we had an unknown malware, capable of connecting to an Internet WebDAV server (an original protocol, in comparison to other documented campaigns), and capable of both downloading (command and control channel) and uploading (exfiltration channel) AES-encrypted information (with a 256 bits key length) from/to different paths of the WebDAV.

But the surprises were not over yet; after analyzing the remaining attachments (remember that several users of the organization received malicious messages), we saw that each one was different from the others:

  • The dropped statement about the plane crash (the “clean” document) turned out to be the same for all attachments
  • Both the dropped .vbs and DLL were distinct for each message (both the DLL name, always trying to imitate some legitimate Windows DLL, and the DLL file contents)
  • The registry key used (Barbicas for the first sample analyzed) was distinct for each dropper
  • Unpacking time was also distinct for each attachment, varying from 8 minutes to more than 15 minutes (in any case, the process was keeping one of the CPUs at 100% usage)
  • The WebDAV server was the same for all samples, as well as the username and password used to log into it (which it does not mean that, for other possible victim organizations or campaigns, were not generating artifacts that used another credentials)
  • However, both the AES 256 bits key and the upload (exfiltration) and download (command and control) paths were different for each analyzed sample (in all cases, all that information was present in the memory of the unpacked DLL)
  • The extensions used in the uploaded files (.TAR, .TIF, .TXT, etc. for the first attachment analyzed) were distinct for each sample

Therefore, it’s clear that what we saw was probably a possible campaign using (so far) unknown malware, and selecting the victims in a highly targeted way. The attackers used some kind of artifact generator; once a copy is generated, it uniquely identifies the victim as well as the exfiltrated information, by its use of distinct accounts, directories, file extensions and AES keys for each mutation. Furthermore, it is clear that this was almost certainly the first phase in what could have been a longer persistence in the victim organization.

We don’t know what it would have been possible to find after a few weeks, or months, of effective compromise.

Update: on December 8, 2014, Symantec (re)codenames the malware (or at least one of its mutations) as Infostealer.Rodagose (Number of infections: 0 – 49, Number of Sites: 0 – 2). We still prefer Barbicas :-)

It’s been over 4 months since we saw the malware for the first time and an AV vendor has begun to to detect it (and so far, we are not aware of more public presence), reporting “few” infected sites (therefore, is it a campaign that has affected several organizations?); the above, and the character of the highly targeted victims we saw in the case of our customer, maintains the “enigma” for the moment. We will try to keep you informed as more information emerges.

Update 2: on December 9, 2014, Blue Coat publishes a report, (re-re)codenaming the malware as Inception. All information in the report is consistent with what our team observed in August 2014. It seems clear that it’s an APT campaign.

Update 3: on December 10, 2014, Kaspersky codenames it Cloud Atlas.