Who takes responsibility for errors made by smart robots?

As those of us who are interested in robotics know, ir represents one of the great technological advances of the 21st century. However, for this progress to be properly made, it must be accompanied by a transparent and dynamic regulatory framework that unifies and clarifies the uncertainties it generates. However, today there is no such regulatory framework at national, European or international level.

However, there are two references that are worth considering.

Firstly, the recommendation of the European Parliament (Draft Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)) for the establishment of a set of rules on liability. In the face of a possible “new industrial revolution” in which society enters an age of robots, bots, androids and other more advanced forms of AI, it is imperative that the legislator consider the consequences that may result from the use and implantation of these devices in our daily lives.

[Read more…]

Analysis of Linux.Omni

Following our classification and analysis of the Linux and IoT threats currently active, in this article we are going to investigate a malware detected very recently in our honeypots, the Linux.Omni botnet. This botnet has particularly attracted our attention due to the numerous vulnerabilities included in its repertoire of infection (11 different in total), being able to determine, finally, that it is a new version of IoTReaper.

Analysis of the binary

The first thing that strikes us is the label given to the malware at the time of infection of the device, i.e., OMNI, because these last few weeks we were detecting OWARI, TOKYO, SORA, ECCHI… all of them versions of Gafgyt or Mirai and, which do not innovate much compared to what was reported in previous articles.

So, analyzing the method of infection, we find the following instructions:

As you can see, it is a fairly standard script and, therefore, imported from another botnet. Nothing new.

Although everything indicated that the sample would be a standard variant of Mirai or Gafgyt, we carried out the sample download. [Read more…]

Simple & crazy covert channels (I): Asciinema (en)

In the preparation of our audits, we often waste a lot of time developing tools that require a lot of work and, in many cases, do not go unnoticed by those users with a more technical profile.
However, there are other simpler (and equally effective) methods to carry out the exfiltration of information, such as through tools that were not initially designed for this purpose and which, with relatively simple adjustments, allow us to carry it out.

Thus, in the following article the analysis of the asciinema tool will be carried out, as well as the different possibilities of use and how it can be integrated with an attack vector.

Asciinema is a very nice tool that I usually use for demos whose sole function is to register the user’s session and to provide a URL that allows us to easily share the user’s activity. Very valuable information that can be used in a malicious way.

Below, we will see if we could use it as a Linux keylogger and what modifications would be necessary to apply.
[Read more…]

Evading AV with Shellter. I also have Sysmon & Wazuh III. GAME OVER

After the first two posts of the story [1] [2] where we told you about Johnny’s intentions and John’s security, in this post we are going to tell you the outcome, and give you an idea of the two characters in the story.

Johnny:

“Here I am, waiting for my boss to execute the “program” that he has asked me for and that I have prepared for him with special affection”. [Read more…]

Evading AV with Shellter. I also have Sysmon and Wazuh II

After what was seen in the first post of this story in this one we will keep telling you what happens and we will meet the boss. Put yourselves again in that situation that Johnny told us about in the first part.

“Hello, allow me to introduce myself. I’m John, Johnny’s boss. I am aware that I have many enemies among which are surely my competitors or even my own employees. Physically, no one can touch me, I always go with my bodyguards. But technologically, anyone could try to attack my team with the objective of stealing valuable information”.

That’s why, in addition to the corporate antivirus, I decided to add one more layer of security on my computer with Sysmon & Wazuh. [Read more…]

Evading AV with Shellter. I also have Sysmon and Wazuh I

I suggest imagining the following fictitious situation:

I am Johnny, a disgruntled employee. My boss has exploited me, he does not stop sending me tasks, he does not pay me the extra hours and, in addition, he never thanks me for the work I do … One day, fed up with the situation, I said to myself: “he’s going to find out what’s what”. And I started planning: I’m going to hack his computer and steal all the sensitive information he has. But how? After thinking the matter over: I know! I’m going to see if in the results of the internal vulnerability audits, to which I have access, his computer has some security flaw that can be exploited.
Darn! He has everything patched … and I don’t have any money for a 0 day. What I can do?

One day my boss asked me if I knew of any free program to decompress files in Windows operating systems and… [Read more…]

Web auditing: Jump on the bandwagon! (or not)

Usually, whenever we are auditing a web application with a poorly programmed backend, we might  find SQL Injection vulnerabilities. We will mainly encounter Blind, Error-based or -if we get lucky- Union-based injections. However, it is not quite usual to find an SQLi out-of-band vulnerability.

These do not only rely on a vulnerable application, but also on being able to exfiltrate information from a different band than the website.

The fact that the results are sent through a completely different way, along with the variety of shapes that these may take; makes it quite difficult to use automated tools to exploit these kinds of vulnerabilities. Even so, in situations where the server responses are not stable or  are too unreliable, it might be worth trying to exfiltrate information this way.

As an example, lets take a look at an injection found in an audit I performed recently.

This time, the vulnerability was quite weird, as the name of the parameter was sql*** –which shouted injection from miles away- but the website itself wasn’t either returning any errors nor  being affected by time-based techniques. Yet, our best friend Burp active scan seemed convinced that an SQLi was going on at that specific parameter.
[Read more…]

CSIRT.es (in English)

Yesterday, CCN-CERT published the communiqué related to the re-launch of the CSIRT.es group, a forum that brings together the response teams to Spanish incidents or areas of action in Spain, and whose objective is to centralize the exchange of information and facilitate coordination between these very teams.

CSIRT.es  currently consists of more than twenty teams and, as indicated in the press release, public and private actors from different sectors are represented, with different objectives … but they have many points in common; the main one, by definition, to provide a response capability to a given community. And that capability today cannot work if it is intended to operate independently and isolated from other teams: it necessarily requires direct collaboration with third parties. Beyond forums such as FIRST or TF-CSIRT, we believe that a point that enables collaboration between CSIRT and areas of action in Spain is more than interesting and necessary. [Read more…]

Restricted Zone: Geopositioning not allowed

The tendency to “be permanently connected” places at our disposal a series of tools with which to “make our lives more comfortable” but this, in turn, exposes us to multiple threats that may negatively affect us as individuals or in our organizations. It is possible to think that this question is too internalized by those who dedicate themselves directly or indirectly to the world of security. However, the reality leads us to discover that the number of anecdotes and news related to security incidents continues to grow and, in many cases, the protagonists are precisely those who dedicate themselves to security.

In today’s post we put the focus on the impact that the information collected and published through the Strava tool has caused.
[Read more…]

Exchange forensics: The mysterious case of ghost mail (I)

(Note: This is a fiction story, the characters and situations are not real, the only real thing is the technical part, which is based on a mixture of work done, experiences of other colleagues and research carried out. If you want a version with the same technical dose but with less narrative, you can consult the video of the talk that the author gave at the 11th STIC Conference of the CCN-CERT here).

Another day in the office, with a list of pending tasks to plan longer than the beard of Richard Stallman and none of them entertaining: reports, documentation of a couple of projects and the preparation of a meeting is what the menu of the day offers for almost the entire week.
Luckily, the saying that “no plan survives contact with the enemy” in this case works in our favor. The phone rings, and my boss goes straight to the point: “A YARA rule has been triggered from the ATD group in CARMEN of [Redacted] (entity whose identity we are going to leave anonymously, calling it “the Organization” from now on). Take your stuff and rush over there.”

The adrenaline rush at the thrill of the hunt is instantaneous: ATD is our internal name of a group of attackers that we hunted a few months ago on another client, and our reversers ripped the malware open from top to bottom without mercy. The analysis allowed us to detect a series of particular “irregularities” in their way of acting, which allowed us to generate a series of high fidelity YARA rules (that is, false positives practically null). If it was triggered on CARMEN (our advanced intrusion detection tool), then 99% sure to be infected”.
[Read more…]